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Abstract: This article explores the inter-relationship of collective action within the business 
community, the nature of the political regime and the security of firms’ property rights.  
Drawing on a pair of surveys recently administered in Russia, we present evidence that 
post-communist business associations have begun to coordinate business influence over 
state actors in a manner that is sensitive to regional politics. A firm’s ability to defend itself 
from government predation and to shape its institutional environment as well as its propen-
sity to invest in physical capital are strongly related to both its membership in a business 
association and the level of democratization in its region. Of particular note, the positive 
effect of association membership on securing property rights increases in less democratic 
regions. The evidence, that is, suggests that collective action in the business community 
substitutes for democratic pressure in constraining public officials. 
 
Key words: collective action, property rights, political institutions, business associations 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään yritysten, poliittisen järjestelmän ja omistusoikeuksien 
turvallisuuden vaikutuksia toisiinsa. Työssä käytetään kahta äskettäin Venäjällä tehtyä ky-
selytutkimusta ja havaitaan, että siirtymätalouksissa elinkeinoelämän järjestöt ovat ry-
htyneet vaikuttamaan poliittiseen päätöksentekoon. Tämän vaikuttamisen luonne riippuu 
kuitenkin kunkin alueen poliittisesta järjestelmästä. Yrityksen mahdollisuuksia puolustau-
tua julkisen vallan haitalliselta toiminnalta sekä investoida enemmän edistävät selvästi 
jäsenyys jossakin liike-elämän järjestössä ja toiminta-alueen demokraattisuus. On erityis-
esti huomattava, että järjestöjen jäsenyyden positiivinen vaikutus on voimakkaampi 
vähemmän demokraattisilla alueilla. Näyttää siis siltä, että elinkeinoelämän yhteistoiminta 
on substituutti demokraattiselle painostukselle julkisen vallan toiminnan rajoitteena. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Much of the literature on transition-era political economy portrays firms as actors whose 
interactions with state officials occur largely independent of one another. Whether suffer-
ing from bureaucratic predation, capturing the organs of state power, or cooperating with 
government officials to mitigate external pressures, post-communist firms have been 
viewed largely as acting alone rather than in concert with one another. Though the business 
community – or at least significant subsets of it – constitutes a true community in the sense 
of its individual members sharing interests, little attention has been given to how those in-
terests have been shaped and pursued by organizations for collective action. This article 
seeks to address this imbalance. Drawing on two surveys conducted in Russia, we present 
evidence that post-communist business associations help secure the property rights of their 
members. Standing as evidence of a nascent, post-communist civil society, these organiza-
tions appear to boost some firms’ capacity both to resist the state’s “grabbing hand” and to 
guide the design of new rules and regulations.  
This article also addresses the broader question of the relationship between political 
regimes and property rights. By exploiting the variation in electoral competition across 
Russia’s territorial subjects, we show that in more democratic regions firms are less vul-
nerable to the caprice and predatory behavior of state officials. Firms in these regions, that 
is, appear better able to thwart corruption and to influence the evolution of formal eco-
nomic institutions. Both direct and indirect causal mechanisms appear to be at work. The 
greater security of property observed in more democratic settings is consistent with elec-
toral pressures serving as a direct constraint on state power. Political openness, moreover, 
by promoting collective action, indirectly increases business’ capacity to strengthen prop-
erty rights. 
Of particular note, we observe an interesting interaction between political regimes 
and organized business’ role in securing property rights. Although business associations 
are growing fastest in the more democratic regions, the marginal effect of membership ap-
pears to be less in these regions. Although property rights are more secure, on average, for 
all firms in more democratic settings, they are more secure only for the subset of firms that 
organize in less democratic settings. This suggests that collective action in the business 
community acts as a substitute for broader democratic pressures in constraining state 
threats to property.  William Pyle 
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In general terms, the story presented here is consistent with a familiar causal 
framework. The distribution of political power shapes economic institutions that, in turn, 
structure incentives at the firm-level to engage (or not) in productive behavior. When po-
litical forces compel public officials both to limit predatory behavior and grant non-state 
actors a voice in designing rules and regulations, the economic environment becomes more 
predictable. The relationship between effort and reward becomes clearer. And the incen-
tives to invest become stronger. 
We contribute to this narrative by considering collective action’s role in a manner 
unique to the literature that follows in this tradition. Thematically, the article resembles the 
work of Mancur Olson and his co-authors. The connection they highlight between political 
competition and stronger property rights is echoed here as is Olson’s recognition that more 
open politics potentially affects property rights by way of collective action. But whereas 
Olson regarded the organizations that democracy fosters as threats to economic develop-
ment, our evidence suggests otherwise. When state actors render property rights insecure, 
business’ motivation for organizing may be more benign than Olson suspected. Indeed, in 
these circumstances, the threat posed by the state may motivate collective action as much 
or more than narrow rent-seeking.  
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on how the distribu-
tion of political power in a society affects the provision of property rights’ protections. 
Section 3 discusses the history of collective action in the Russian business community and 
introduces the surveys used in the subsequent analysis. Section 4 then explores the firm-
level and regional determinants of business association membership, giving particular at-
tention to the role played by political regimes. Section 5 introduces two firm-specific 
“property rights” variables and highlights their relationship to association membership, re-
gional political competition and their interaction. It also demonstrates that similar relation-
ships hold between these variables and a measure of recent investment activity by the 
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2   Political power and property rights 
 
Folowing Acemoglu et al. (2004), we presume the distribution of political power in a soci-
ety to be a function of both formal political institutions and the ability of social groups to 
solve the collective action problem and organize. Political institutions, which constitute the 
rules governing politics – including the “form of government, for example, democracy vs. 
dictatorship…and the extent of constraints on politicians and political elites (390-91)” – 
serve as the basis of de jure political power.  Successful social coordination and the subse-
quent aggregation of resources can constitute an additional source of de facto political 
power.  
Together, the two determine a society’s prevailing economic institutions, including 
most importantly, the structure of its property rights. By way of an example germane to the 
themes here, Acemoglu et al. (2004) highlight Robert Bates’ research on the variation in 
agricultural policies across the developing world. In many African and Latin American 
countries, Bates describes how property rights have been abused by marketing boards pay-
ing below-market prices for crops as a measure to divert resources from farmers to urban 
constituents. He offers the Columbian coffee sector as a noteworthy exception (1997). 
Even though its producers were small and not organized, they did not have to confront con-
fiscatory policies because “the structure of political institutions, and in particular the struc-
ture of party competition, rendered them pivotal, giving them power over the political for-
tunes of those with ambition for office (51)…” In Kenya, successful collective action, in 
the form of the Kenya National Farmer’s Union’s lobbying efforts, produced policies that 
were similarly respectful of property rights (1981).    
 
2.1   Political regimes 
 
Although arguments that politics affect property rights are not uncommon, there is neither 
a consensus as to how they do so, nor is there a great deal of contemporary evidence that 
demonstrates a link. Drawing on historical evidence, North (1990) connects the spread of 
democratic freedoms to the evolution of more secure property rights. Democracy, he ar-
gues, not only enhances the voice of those bearing the burden of socially detrimental poli-
cies, such as the under-provision of property rights’ protections, it “eliminates the capri-
cious capacity of a ruler to confiscate wealth (51).” Citing growth patterns of European cit-
ies between 1050 and 1800, De Long and Shleifer (1993) make a similar point. “Absolut-William Pyle 
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ist” princes, they argue, presided over slower growth because they taxed to maximize own 
revenue; less autocratic governments, more responsive to social pressures, had to be more 
concerned with private economic prosperity and thus tended to be more respectful of prop-
erty rights.   
Olson (1993), perhaps, lays out the political incentives of democratic majorities and auto-
crats most clearly: 
Though both the majority and the autocrat have an encompassing interest in the 
society because they control tax collections, the majority in addition earns a sig-
nificant share of the market income of the society, and this gives it a more en-
compassing interest in the productivity of the society … Democratic political 
competition, even when it works very badly, does not give the leader of the gov-
ernment the incentive that an autocrat has to extract the maximum attainable so-
cial surplus … (570-71)  
Political leaders in more democratic settings, in other words, have a stronger self-interest 
in promoting “good” economic institutions. Olson and co-authors show with recent data 
that measures of autocracy at the country level are negatively and strongly correlated with 
several proxies for property rights’ protections (Clague et al., 1996).  They conclude that 
democratic freedoms and property rights spring from the same institutions and are comp-
lementary: a “democracy without any property rights … is not in the feasible set (245).” 
Not all agree, however, that the major threat to property rights resides in an unconstrained 
sovereign. As Przeworski and Limongi (1991) note, nineteenth century conservatives and 
socialists alike believed that widespread suffrage and freedom of association would empo-
wer the dispossessed, threatening the propertied classes. Moreover, they point out that if 
democracy promotes greater property rights’ security, a clear correlation between regime 
types and economic growth across countries should be observed. Evidence on this score, 
however, has been at best mixed.  
 
2.2   Social coordination  
 
Ironically, Olson (1982, 1997, 2000) also plays up the possibility that non-state actors may 
threaten property rights in democratic settings. The same forces which facilitate capital ac-
cumulation by constraining political power also, over the longer term, enable collective 
action for the purposes of redistribution. A small group of firms, for instance, may organ-
ize so as to capture the political process and orchestrate a diversion of resources in its fa-
vor. Olson, however, may be a bit too quick both to assume the worst about collective ac-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/ 2007 
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tion in democratic settings and to suggest that the less benign version of collective action is 
any more likely in democratic settings than under other regime types. Although firms in 
more democratic settings, almost by definition, confront lower costs of organizing, it is un-
clear whether the benefits of associational activities rise or fall as political competitive 
changes. Compared to public officials in more competitive settings, those operating where 
democratic pressures are particularly weak may be more sensitive to the voices of special 
interests intent on pushing policies that subvert the general interest. Finer (1997) and Dam-
aska (1986), for instance, in noting how small, well-organized elites can endanger devel-
opment objectives, argue that the power of these groups is more likely to be problematic in 
politically less competitive settings. Narrowly-focused interest groups, that is, are apt to 
wield more influence when constraints on executive authority are minimal.   
Not all scholars share these suspicions of social coordination. Putnam (1993), nota-
bly, views civil society groups as broadly supportive of democratic and development ob-
jectives. The association of individual actors with divergent interests tends to moderate so-
cial divisions and contribute to collaborative advocacy for broad social interests. Weingast 
(1997) makes the connection between social coordination and property rights’ protection 
more explicit. He argues that property rights become secure for a broad cross-section of 
economic actors when social groups have mechanisms by which to coordinate their re-
sponse to any infringement of property rights by a sovereign.  Only in the presence of such 
mechanisms is it in the sovereign’s self interest to respect limits on his behavior. 
Similar themes have been picked up on in studies devoted specifically to business 
community coordination. Some have argued that businesses acting in concert with one an-
other are more apt to push for the provision of public goods than businesses acting alone 
(Lambsdorff, 2002). Direct, individualized lobbying tends to result in private benefits for 
the lobbying party as well, potentially, as government officials at the expense of other 
firms. The efforts of business organizations, however, may be less distortionary in that they 
are more apt to reflect a broader array of interests. Indeed, recent research suggests that 
corruption and formalized lobbying are substitutes, with the supplanting of the former by 
the latter being correlated with higher levels of economic development (Campos and Gio-
vannoni, 2007; Harstad and Svensson, 2006). Doner and Schneider (2000), moreover, pre-
sent evidence that business associations play an important roll in mitigating the types of 
state failures that can be particularly acute in developing countries. By both diminishing 
free rider problems and aggregating political power, business associations are more apt William Pyle 
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than individual firms to push for and realize welfare-enhancing improvements in public 
administration and stronger guarantees of property rights. Schneider (2004), however, is 
agnostic as to whether these public-good-like benefits from business coordination are more 
or less apparent in democratic settings. 
 
2.3   Business’ power during the transition 
 
Scholarship on the post-communist transition has given nascent business organizations 
short shrift when considering how firms pursue interests vis a vis the state. In most treat-
ments, this disregard is implicit. Firms, that is, are portrayed almost exclusively as engag-
ing in personalized exchanges with government officials. For instance, Hellman et al. 
(2003) focus on the firm-specific correlates of “influencing” or “capturing” state officials. 
“Captor firms,” which make payments to public officials to secure favorable policies), re-
port improvements in the security of their property rights, particularly in environments in 
which other firms also strike similar deals. The authors disregard the roll of associational 
membership on firm strategies and performance even though they had collected such data. 
Other analyses have more explicitly considered the role of business associations but con-
cluded that collective action problems have minimized their significance (Gelbach, 2006). 
There are several noteworthy exceptions to this general trend. On the basis of Rus-
sian survey data, Frye (2002, 2004) shows that of those firms reporting at least some suc-
cess in influencing new laws and regulations at the federal level, half reported having used 
the services of business organizations. He also demonstrates a strong correlation between 
association membership and a firm’s propensity to invest. Campos and Giovannoni (2007) 
draw on the same cross-country dataset as Hellman et al. (2003) and Gelbach (2006) to 
show that lobby membership is positively related to firms’ self-reported influence on offi-
cials in the legislative and executive branches.  And Duvanova (forthcoming), utilizing the 
same data, demonstrates a strong correlation between firms’ perception of bureaucratic 
corruption and business association membership. In the same article, she presents convinc-
ing case study evidence from Russia of a causal link between corruption and subsequent 
business association development.  
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2.4   Summary 
 
The literature review to this point serves as an introduction to the questions that are central 
to this paper. In broad terms, the interest here lies in the relationship between the distribu-
tion of political power and the security of property rights. As noted, political power is 
taken to be a function of both formal political institutions – i.e., regime type – and success-
ful collective action within the business community.  For one, we explore the independent 
effects of both regime type and collective action on property rights. Do firms appear to be 
more secure in their property rights, ceteris paribus, in (a) more democratic settings and 
(b) as members of collective action associations? The existing literature speaks to these 
questions but not with a single voice. We are also interested in the largely unexplored 
question of the inter-relationship between collective action and political institutions. To 
this end, we explore the relationship between regime type and association growth as well 




3   Russian business associations and survey data 
 
3.1   History of Russian associations during the transition period 
 
Many of the first Russian associations grew up to promote interests of small private initia-
tives that were permitted during the late Soviet period.
2 Others that date back to this era 
were organized by large state enterprises that shared an interest in preserving inter-firm ties 
and access to state subsidies as the mechanisms of centralized economic coordination 
evaporated. Some associations were established from the top down by ministry officials as 
their own hedge against the uncertainty of the future (Lehmbruch, 1999). And still others 
probably served as fronts for corrupt or profit-motivated ventures. Generally speaking, 
these first associations were neither well organized nor transparent in purpose (Sulakshin 
and Romanikhin, 2003). Two noteworthy exceptions include the two associations that to 
this day remain the most developed and influential, the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RSPP) and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TPP).  
                                                 
2 Much of this section draws on the narrative in Pyle (2006a). William Pyle 
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RSPP first developed as a powerful alliance of Soviet-era enterprise directors that 
in the initial stages of the reform era lobbied for the retention of many price controls, con-
tinued access to state subsidies and strict limits on foreign investment (McFaul, 1993; Han-
son and Teague, 2005). By the mid- to late-1990s, it had developed a network of affiliated 
associations to provide information as well as consulting, legal and accounting services to 
members throughout the country. And at the federal level, its “expert” institute actively 
participated in the drafting of the state’s economic programs and was consulted on bills 
before the Duma. After the 1998 financial crisis, its federal-level organization adopted a 
more pro-market orientation. Almost no attention has been given to the activities of its le-
gally independent affiliates in territorial subjects throughout the Russian Federation.  
Like the affiliates of RSPP, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TPP), which 
are operated independently in each of Russia’s 87 territorial subjects, draws their member-
ship from many different sectors of the economy. Regulated through a special 1993 law 
that guarantees their independence from state bodies, the TPP network traces its roots to a 
communist-era institution that promoted commercial ties with the non-communist bloc. 
Compared to the RSPP, it has generally maintained a lower political profile and has fo-
cused more on service provision to members. As with the RSPP, relatively little has been 
written of its activities, particularly those of the 170-plus independent Chambers that oper-
ate at the regional and municipal levels.        
The reforms of the 1990s also gave rise to a wave of national-level, sector-specific 
organizations as well as a number of multi-sector and sector-specific organizations that op-
erate at the regional and municipal levels. Although the lack of a comprehensive registry 
has rendered an accurate accounting of their numbers impossible, one recent estimate puts 
the numbers of business associations nationally at close to five thousand.
3  
 
3.2  Surveys of Russian associations and firms 
 
In light of the lack of comprehensive sources of information about their political (and eco-
nomic) activities and influence, three separate surveys were administered by the author in 
2003 and 2004. First, to assess membership rates by firm size and sector, a simple screen-
ing survey of over 1300 enterprises was carried out in 48 territorial subjects of the Russian 
                                                 
3 July 2005 interview in Moscow with director of the department for cooperation with business associations 
at the chamber of commerce of the Russian Federation. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





4 The findings were then used to construct a sample for a more detailed survey 
of 606 firms. An effort was made to achieve roughly equal distribution across both indus-
tries and the regions sampled. By construction, roughly half of the firms were to be mem-
bers of associations [see map of regional distribution]. The screening survey’s findings of 
membership rate variation across branches and employment size were used to weight the 
sample’s distribution of members and non-members across these two dimensions.  
In addition to standard firm-specific information, the survey asked firm managers a 
series of questions about their interaction with business associations. Some of these asso-
ciation-specific questions were directed at all firms and some were only designed to be an-
swered by members of associations. This latter group included a series of questions about 
the two associations most important to the enterprise. Of the 280 (or 46.2%) firms in the 
survey that belonged to at least one association, 88 belonged to at least two. Using the in-
formation provided on these 366 memberships, we calculated the share of firms in the 
sample that belong to associations of different types. As can be seen in Table 1, 39.4% of 
firms in the full sample belong to at least one regional association (i.e., one whose mem-
bership is derived almost exclusively from a single territorial subject), whereas only 9.6% 
belong to a federal or multi-regional association. Of firms that belong to regional associa-
tions, the overwhelming majority belong to multi-sector associations. Finally, we see that 
roughly equal numbers joined the regional associations before and after 1998, the final full 
year of the Yeltsin administration and the last year of the country’s prolonged period of 
economic decline.    
A third survey was administered to the directors of two hundred independent busi-
ness associations. In the absence of an official registry, a variety of sources were used to 
construct a sample of active associations that we feel is broadly representative in terms of 
regional distribution, the mix between sector-specific and multi-sector associations and the 
importance of RSPP affiliates and the TPP network. Among this group, 145 associations 
were “regional” in the sense of drawing their membership almost exclusively from a single 
region. 
Because we exploit regional variation to understand the inter-relationship among 
political regimes, property rights and collective action, we are interested less in the role of 
                                                 
4 For more information on the construction of the samples as well as summary data from the screening   
survey, see Pyle (2006a). William Pyle 
 
Organized business, political regimes and 




federal-level business associations than those that operate on a regional level. In Table 2, 
we present summary data on the members and non-members of these regional associations. 
With the exception of average firm size, the differences between the two populations of 
firms are not terribly striking. Clearly, however, members of regional associations tend to 
be larger than non-members, a finding that is mirrored elsewhere in the world and is con-
sistent with larger firms having a greater capacity both to absorb membership dues and to 
influence the activities of the associations they join.
5 
A rough sense of how flows into regional associations have changed across time 
can be gleaned from the years in which our surveyed firms report having joined. As we can 
see in Table 3, a small minority reports having entered their regional associations in the 
Soviet era. After 1992, entry has been steady but seems to have picked up after the period 
of economic decline that ended in 1998. Indeed, the biggest spike in membership occurs 
during Putin’s first years in office, a period that corresponds with a rapid acceleration in 
economic growth.  Table 3 also provides information on the founding dates of the associa-
tions in our sample that operate at the regional level. Roughly half were established in 
1995 or before; roughly half were established afterwards. 
 
3.3   Association services 
 
Business associations the world over engage in a wide range of activities. Like many of the 
organizations that populate civil society, their functions can be divided along two dimen-
sions. First, they help develop and strengthen “horizontal” ties among non-state actors. 
Perhaps most notably, they contribute to the provision of a public good by facilitating in-
ter-firm information flows on the reliability of potential customers and suppliers (Pyle, 
2005), as well as on new technologies and market opportunities. They also may assist, eit-
her directly or indirectly, in the resolution of inter-firm disputes (Pyle, 2006b). Business 
associations can also be instrumental in the “vertical” relationship between the business 
community and state actors. They may aggregate and transmit business interests to state 
bodies as well as protect the communities that they represent from abuses of state power. 
                                                 
5 Of those that were not members of associations, roughly 10% cited the membership fees and 20% cited the 
time demands as a reason for not joining. Golikova (2007) also finds from even more recent survey evidence 
in Russia that larger firms are more apt to be members of an association. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Indeed, our survey data show that many regional associations report offering, and many 
members report receiving, both types of services.  
In Table 4, we report on three of the distinct vertical services addressed in the sur-
veys: lobbying government officials, participating in the legislative process and protection 
from illegitimate government interference. The managers of both firms and the associa-
tions were asked to consider the importance of each of these services.  The members of re-
gional associations were asked to evaluate how critical the services were to the develop-
ment and well-being of their enterprise on a scale from 0 to 5.
6 Table 4 reports the percent-
age of those member firms that assessed the service’s importance as a 4 or 5.  Smaller 
members, perhaps unsurprisingly, place more value on the protection received from ille-
gitimate government interference.  
We also categorize member firms by the year in which they joined a regional asso-
ciation. Using 1998 as the dividing point, we observe that the most noteworthy difference 
between firms that joined earlier and those that joined later is in the value given to partici-
pating in the legislative process. Specifically, those that report joining more recently re-
ceive greater value from the association’s ability to providing them access to the legislative 
process.   
In the last two columns, we provide the assessments of business association manag-
ers as to these same services. They were asked, as well, to assess on a scale from 0 to 5 the 
“importance” of the service to their association both at the time of their founding and when 
the survey was administered. As with the firms’ managers, we record the percentage of re-
spondents who answered with a 4 or 5.  We first note that relative to the managers of 
member firms, the managers of the associations attach greater importance to the vertical 
functions. But this difference need not be a surprise. It is possible, of course, that associa-
tion managers possess an exaggerated sense of their organization’s importance. But it may 
also be the case that they have a fuller understanding of their services’ value, particularly if 
they are provided directly by association personnel directly. Another noteworthy feature of 
Table 4’s data is the reported increase in “participation in the legislative process.” In the 
year in which the associations were founded, this function was easily the least important on 
this list. But by 2004, it ranked just behind lobbying as the most important. This jump and 
                                                 
6 A “0” denotes the association to which the firm belongs does not offer the service; a “1” denotes that the 
association offers the service but it makes “no impact” on the firm’s well-being; a “5” denotes that the ser-
vice has an “extremely large” impact on the firm’s well-being.  William Pyle 
 
Organized business, political regimes and 




the comparative data on firms joining before and after 1998 point to a growing formaliza-




4   Determinants of membership 
 
Unlike in some continental European countries, business association membership in Russia 
is voluntary. Provided that firms pay required dues, the survey evidence suggests that there 
are few, if any, barriers to joining and retaining membership.
8 For instance, we found little 
evidence that associations are exclusive clubs. Only one (of 326) non-members in our sur-
vey reported having been denied admission to a business association. And of current mem-
bers, only one-sixth reported knowing of an instance in which their association had expel-
led a member. Most of these cases related to financial issues (e.g., not paying dues), while 
a smaller number stemmed from a member’s violations of established behavioral norms. 
If membership is largely a matter of choice, it is worth considering the factors that 
influence a firm’s decision. We thus set up a probit model in which the dependent variable 
is membership in a regional association. To evaluate whether or not the determinants of 
membership have changed over time, we use the cutoff point of 1998, running the model 
once with the dependent variable capturing whether the firm joined a regional association 
in 1998 or before and once with it reflecting whether the firm joined an association after 
1998. 
Applying an expected cost-benefit calculus, we hypothesize that the decision to join 
an association is a function of both firm-specific and regional characteristics. With respect 
to the former, we anticipate that a firm’s size (as measured by its employment level in 
2001) will affect its capacity to pay membership dues as well as to influence the agenda of 
an association once it joins. Thus, ceteris paribus, larger firms should demonstrate a 
greater proclivity for joining.  
We also consider factors that may reflect a firm’s access to alternate mechanisms 
for influencing state actors. For instance, older firms as well as those that are state-owned, 
                                                 
7 Golikova (2007) highlights a similar trend using data from a retrospective panel. 
8 There is a great deal of variation in reported annual dues for regional business associations, but the average 
is roughly five hundred dollars. There is strong positive correlation between reported dues and the size of the 
enterprise. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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may have access through other, perhaps less formal, channels that do not require the me-
diation of a formal organization. We thus include dummy variables for both state owner-
ship and establishment in the post-Soviet era. If our hypothesis about alternate channels of 
influence is correct, we would expect that state-owned firms would be less likely to have 
joined associations, while those firms without roots in the old system would be more likely 
to have become members. 
We also include a dummy variable whose value is a function of the firm’s geo-
graphic location. If the firm is located in a territorial subject’s capital – nearly always the 
biggest city in a given region – its proximity to other firms makes it more likely to discover 
the benefits of associational membership and, possibly, participate in the “horizontal”, 
network-building activities sponsored by the association. And finally, we include sector-
level controls. 
At the regional level, we consider one economic and one political variable. We in-
clude the region’s per capita income level in 2001 because in cross-country studies, meas-
ures of economic development have been shown to be positively correlated with lobby 
membership (Bischoff, 2003; Campos and Giovannoni, 2007). We also include a measure 
of regional democratization. We suspect that in more democratic settings the costs of busi-
ness coordination will be lower. State officials in less democratic regions, that is, likely 
make it harder for civil society organizations to operate even if their stated purpose is apo-
litical. Less democratic governments tend to be more suspicious of independent organiza-
tions since they may serve as a basis for future political opposition (Przeworski, 1991). But 
since the relative benefits from group membership in democratic and non-democratic set-
ting are ambiguous, we have no strong ex ante expectation as to the relationship between 
regional democracy and membership.  
The “democracy index” is a joint product of the Public Expertise Institute, the IN-
DEM Foundation and the Merkator Analytical Center, three independent and respected 
Russian organizations. Their rating of individual regions takes on values between 1.0 and 
5.0 (in increments of 0.5) and is based on the premises that more democratic regions 
should (a) adhere more closely to the “one person, one vote” principle, (b) demonstrate 
greater turnover in the executive branch, and (c) exhibit a higher level of political competi-
tion and diversity of representation in the legislature. Specifically, their index aggregates 
ten years of electoral data based on several objective indicators: time in office of the sitting 
governor; the number of competitors in regional gubernatorial elections and the difference William Pyle 
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between the winner and the nearest competitor; the share of “Edinaya Rossiya” (the “party 
of power”) in the regional parliament; the threshold (i.e., minimum percentage of votes) for 
a party to qualify for seats in the regional legislature; the participation rate in parliamentary 
elections (wherein proximity to 100% is taken to indicate coercion or fraud); and a meas-
ure of the difference between the percentage of votes received by party candidates and the 
percentage of seats held by those parties in the legislature. The results of their research 
have been publicized in Novaya Gazeta, perhaps the most highly respected independent 
newspaper in contemporary Russia. Table 5 presents both the two regional variables for 
those regions in which the survey of firms was conducted.
9 
The results from the probit regressions are presented in Table 6. As suspected, lar-
ger firms have been more likely to join regional business associations. This finding is ro-
bust to the time frame; larger firms were more apt to join after 1998 as well as in or before 
that year.  Additionally, our proxies for a firm having alternate channels through which to 
influence state actors demonstrate some relationship to regional association membership. 
Firms established in the Soviet era have been less likely to join business associations. 
Firms that were state-owned at the time of the survey, moreover, were less likely to be 
members of associations; although this relationship was statistically significant only for 
those firms that joined an association in 1998 or before.    
The coefficients on the regional capital variable are suggestive of a dynamic in 
which associations’ growth was initially largely confined to the capital city but has since 
expanded to other parts of the territorial subject. We also observe that regions that were 
wealthier in 2001 had somewhat more membership growth in or before 1998, whereas less 
wealthy regions seem to have had more growth in the years since. 
Finally, we observe a very strong and positive correlation between the democracy 
index and membership in regional associations. But the precise source of this relationship 
is not clear. There are good reasons to suspect why democratic governance may increase a 
firm’s ability to join a business association. But it could also be plausibly argued that cau-
                                                 
9 As a test of the democracy index’s validity, we used a survey question that asked firm managers “Which 
parties, if any, does your firm seek assistance from to influence the content of new laws and regulations that 
will have an impact on your business?”  The responses included legislators, the media, trade unions, execu-
tive branch personnel and influential individuals (e.g., business people). The first three institutions tend to be 
broadly representative of social forces and democratic freedoms. Indeed, firms in regions with a higher score 
on the index were more likely to report seeking assistance from these three, effects that were all significant at 
the 5% level.  Firms in more democratic regions were no more likely to rely upon personnel in the executive 
branch or influential individuals.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




sation runs in the opposite direction. Perhaps in those regions experiencing the most robust 
growth of associational membership, the growing associations have pushed regional poli-
tics in a more democratic direction. The models that explore the time effects of member-
ship provide some guidance on this question of causation. If democracy – as measured by a 
partly retrospective index that aggregates ten years of electoral data since the mid-1990s – 
drives associational membership, we should expect to see a stronger relationship between 
it and post-1998 membership than between it and pre-1998 membership. But if associa-
tional membership drives democracy, we might expect to see the opposite in the sense that 
those regions in which early membership was more likely had subsequently become more 
democratic.  The data, however, conform more closely to the former story. Regions scoring 
higher on the democracy index have witnessed the fastest growth in recent years in their 
regional business associations. More democratic regional regimes, in other words, seem to 
be more encouraging of business collective action.  
 
 
5  Business coordination and property rights       
 
Having discussed the determinants of association membership, we turn to membership’s 
relationship to the security of property rights. Prior research suggests that mechanisms that 
facilitate social coordination can be critical to the state’s respecting for property rights on 
more than just a selective basis (Weingast, 1997). Successful coordination mechanisms 
have the capacity to sustain an equilibrium in which any actor that is party to the coordina-
tion commits to punishing encroachments against any other participant in the coordination 
mechanism. Facing the prospect of a collective response, state actors choose to observe the 
property rights of all coordinating parties. Some, indeed, have suggested that business as-
sociations play this role in emerging market contexts (Doner and Schneider, 2000; Du-
vanova, forthcoming).   
 
5.1.   Protection from bureaucratic predation 
 
We first consider the capacity of firms to defend themselves against government predation. 
All firms in our survey were asked whether in the previous three years, they had experi-
enced any “unplanned inspections” – i.e., an un-scheduled visit from an employee of a William Pyle 
 
Organized business, political regimes and 




government agency. In the Russian context, the phrase has effectively become a euphe-
mism for bribe extraction. Indeed, in an attempt to combat this sort of petty corruption, a 
special law was passed in the summer of 2001 formally restricting the number of visits that 
representatives of state agencies (e.g., tax, fire safety, police, sanitary inspection, etc.). 
Nevertheless, firms have continued to complain about multiple unplanned inspections 
(CEFIR, 2005). Often, firms simply provide the government official with a “voluntarily 
offered payment” in exchange for forgiving a purported violation. Some firms, however, 
choose to appeal to a third party (Azfar and Thomas, 2005).  
Since appealing an unplanned inspection is a choice, we would expect it to reflect 
considerations of the relevant costs and benefits. Choosing not to appeal could be inter-
preted as an implicit acknowledgment by the firm that it does not have the wherewithal to 
overturn the results. If the probability of over-turning the results is sufficiently low, it se-
lects not to incur the costs of an appeal. A firm that appeals, however, signals by its choice 
a belief that it possesses the ability to change the inspection’s result. Our particular interest 
here is whether or not this willingness to stand up for one’s property rights vis a vis state 
officials is sensitive to membership in a regional association and/or the measure of region-
level democratization. 
Of the firms that responded to the question about having experienced an “un-
planned inspection” in the previous three years, 67.9% (410 of 604) reported that they had. 
A large subset of these, 342 firms, reported disagreeing either with the necessity for the 
unplanned check(s) or with the result(s). Of these firms, 59.1% did not appeal to any third 
party, choosing presumably to comply with a “ruling” with which they did not agree. The 
remaining firms sought out the assistance of at least one third party. Roughly one-fifth of 
the firms that reported disagreeing with the necessity or the results of the un-planned in-
spection appealed either to a commercial (arbitrazh) court or to other government bodies 
(21.3% and 20.5%, respectively). In other words, they appealed to government institutions 
for redress against the behavior of a “rogue” bureaucrat. 
To assess the determinants of firms’ responses to inspections with which they did 
not agree, we undertake a series of probit-type regressions. Since firms may derive power 
over state officials from their control over labor by implicitly trading votes or other assets 
for influence, we control for the number of full-time employees (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994). We also control for a firm’s access to informal channels of influence. State-owned 
enterprises as well as those with roots in the pre-Soviet era may have special ties with BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




powerful state actors that may increase the potential payoff from an appeal (Hellman et al., 
2003). Controls are also included for the influence of foreign owners and the firm’s mem-
bership in a commercial group. Finally, since it is quite conceivable that the cost-benefit 
calculation surrounding the decision to appeal is influenced by regional factors, including 
the political environment, we control for regional democratization and per capita income. 
As shown in Table 7, we find that smaller firms were less likely to pursue the pro-
active strategy. Larger firms are both more likely to appeal to the court as well as to gov-
ernment officials. The models also demonstrate a fairly strong relationship between the de-
cision to appeal and regional characteristics. Firms in wealthier regions, all else equal, are 
more apt to behave proactively. Specifically, they more frequently appeal to non-court 
government bodies. Democracy also appears to be associated with a more vigorous defense 
of property. But this effect is tempered when a control is included for the firm’s member-
ship in a regional business association.  
Most notably, the results in Table 7 indicate that even when controlling for regional 
democratization, business association membership is positively and strongly associated 
with appealing to both the arbitration court and to other government bodies. Members’ 
proclivity to not passively accept the “results” of an unplanned inspection is consistent 
with the theoretical argument and prior case study evidence that membership in an organi-
zation for collective action increases a firm’s capability to punish state officials for violat-
ing its property rights (Weingast, 1997; Doner and Schneider, 2000). Perhaps exploiting 
this potential, association members may face lower costs of accessing officials that are able 
to rectify an unjustly imposed penalty.
10 The relationship may additionally be a function of 
associations’ collection and dissemination of information on how to best handle problems 
with corrupt government inspectors. Of regional association members, 9.4% report having 




                                                 
10 Most associations report having drawn the majority of their personnel from industry, often from the asso-
ciations’ members. Roughly one-third have recruited from executive branch agencies. Within the group of 
directors that work full time for an association, a quarter had been employed previously at an executive 
branch agency. And one-eighth of the directors report being members of either the State Duma or regional 
legislatures.  William Pyle 
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5.2   Exercising voice in the design of new institutions 
 
From the break-up of the Soviet Union until the present day, Russia’s territorial subjects 
have exercised a good deal of autonomy in the drafting of laws and regulations governing 
economic activity (Stoner-Weiss, 2006; Solanko, 2003). Table 4, recall, presented response 
data from the managers of both firms and business associations suggesting that associa-
tions have played a meaningful role in this process. But this evidence did not directly ad-
dress the relative influence of members and non-members. Observing that member firms 
have a greater voice than non-members in designing economic institutions would provide 
further support for the proposition that the associations do, indeed, help to shape public 
policy and constrain state officials.    
The surveyed firms were all asked whether or not in the previous three years repre-
sentatives from their firms had been asked to participate in any “working groups” that were 
assisting in the drafting of regional laws and regulations deemed important for their busi-
ness. If they responded positively, they were then asked to assess the degree to which they 
had influenced their final contents. Of all the surveyed firms, 23.9% reported having been 
asked to participate in such regional “working groups” during the previous three years.  
As can be seen from the results of the probit model reported in the first column of 
Table 8, although regional democratization and economic development are positively re-
lated to a firm having been asked to participate, neither of theses variables is related in a 
statistically significant manner to having been invited to participate in these sorts of fo-
rums. Instead, firm-specific characteristics seem to be more important determinants. 
Younger and state-owned firms, all else equal, are less likely to have been invited. Of 
greatest interest to us, however, is the positive and strong association between regional as-
sociation membership and having been asked to participate formally in the drafting of laws 
and regulations at the regional level. This finding, in conjunction with the data in Table 4, 
suggests that regional legislative bodies are increasingly viewing business associations as 
intermediaries in the state-business dialogue.  And in fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
associations are often now contacted by legislative representatives for suggestions of firms 
that should assist in the drafting of new laws and regulations.
11  
Table 8 also includes the results from an ordered probit model in which the depend-
ent variable is a firm’s assessment of the extent to which it had influenced the final product BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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of the drafting process. Firms that reported having participated in such working groups 
during the previous three years were asked about the frequency of their influence on this 
process. Among the 145 respondents, 54.5% answered “never,” 26.2% “occasionally,” 
13.8% “often” and 5.5% responded “always.” Not surprisingly, larger firms report greater 
influence in these forums (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) 
More notably, Table 8 demonstrates that membership in a regional association is 
strongly and positively associated with having an impact on the design of new economic 
institutions. Business association members are more likely to be included in working 
groups and, once having been selected, are more likely than other participants to influence 
the drafting process. Column 3 reveals, however, that this effect is sensitive to the measure 
of regional democratization. The inclusion of a variable interacting regional association 
membership and the democracy index reveals that members’ influence relative to non-
members is greater in less democratic regions. Furthermore, it demonstrates that non-
members in more democratic regions have greater influence than non-members in less de-
mocratic regions, ceteris paribus.  The interaction effect is significant at the 5% level, 
whereas both the independent democracy and business association effects are significant 
the 1% level. 
These results are consistent with the proposition that in the context of influencing 
the design of economic institutions collective action may substitute for democratic pres-
sures. At least in this one sense, membership in a business association appears to become 
more desirable for a firm when the likelihood of state actors responding to broad social 
pressures diminishes. 
 
5.3   Property rights and investment incentives 
 
If the proxies for the security of firms’ property rights are appropriate, we would expect the 
same variables that are closely correlated with them would also be strongly associated with 
a greater propensity to invest. Testing this, we use a survey question that asks whether or 
not a firm had invested in its capital stock in the previous three years. Table 9 presents the 
results from a probit regression in which the response to this question is the dependent 
variable. Indeeed, when controlling for the interaction between regional democracy and 
association membership, we once again observe that the independent effect of association 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Author interview with employee of coordinating council of employers’ associations of Russia. William Pyle 
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membership is positive and significant. The same is true of the independent democracy ef-
fect. Moreover, the interaction of the two is statistically significant and negative in the 
manner observed in the model that assessed the determinants of exercising influence over 
regional laws and regulations. As above, these findings suggest a larger marginal effect of 
association membership in less democratic regions, further lending support to the notion 
that collective action serves as a substitute for democratic pressures in terms of protecting 
firms’ property rights. All firms in democratic regions, that is, feel relatively secure in their 
property rights. But, ceteris paribus, the subset of firms that participate in collective action 
feel more secure in regions in which public officials are relatively less constrained by de-





This article arrives at several conclusions about the property rights’ effects of political re-
gimes and collective action in the business community. Firms in more democratic regions 
appear better equipped to protect themselves from bureaucratic predation and to influence 
the design of new rules and regulations that are relevant to their line of business. These 
findings are consistent with political competition limiting government caprice and preda-
tion and would appear to support the arguments of democratic optimists like North and Ol-
son. As Olson suspected, democracy appears to encourage collective action, but this indi-
rect effect of more open and competitive political regimes is more benign than he feared. 
Indeed, in an environment like Russia’s in which state actors represent a threat to property 
rights, self-defense (rather than redistribution) may develop into the principle motivator of 
business coordination through formalized structures. For as we observe, controlling for re-
gional politics, there is a strong correlation between association membership and the secu-
rity of a firm’s property rights, a finding that only confirms the testimony of some firms 
and most association directors that a primary function of business associations is to pre-
serve firms’ property rights.  Finally, the evidence that business associations serve as a 
kind of substitute for democratic pressures is of particular note. At the least, this result 
suggests that the interaction between political institutions and collective action deserves 
more attention.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 1  Firms in survey sample belonging to a business association 
 
   Percent  of  sample 
Any type of association    46.2 
Regional (any type)    39.4 
Regional, multi-sector    33.8 
Regional, sector-specific    7.9 
Regional (any type), joined after 1998    22.7 
Regional (any type), joined in 1998 or before    18.8 
Federal or multi-regional (any type)    9.6 
 
Notes: Percentages based on questions which asked respondents about the two most important associations 





Table 2  Basic statistics on firms in sample 
 
 Not  member  of   
regional association 
 Member  of  regional 
association 
Full-time employees in 2001  414.5    883.5 
State-owned enterprise (%)  6.3    3.3 
Member of commercial group (%)  20.2    24.3 
Some foreign ownership (%)  9.0    12.2 
Established after 1991 (%)  44.1    40.6 
Located in a regional capital (%)  66.2    73.6 
Sector (%)       
Metallurgy 12.5    12.1 
Chemicals 14.7    22.2 
Machine building & metal working  15.0    10.9 
Construction materials  14.7    10.5 
Wood processing  15.7    12.1 
Light industry  12.3    18.4 
Food industry  15.5    13.8 
      
Observations 367    239 
Notes: A “regional association” is taken to mean any association that draws its membership 
almost exclusively from a single region. A “commercial group” links together firms through ownership in 
a vertically or horizontally-integrated structures.  
  
Table 3  Years in which firms joined and associations founded  
 
  Regional association joined (%)  Regional association formed (%) 
Before 1990  2.3  4.9 
1990-1992 8.6  20.3 
1993-1995 12.5  23.1 
1996-1998 15.6  23.1 
1999-2001 39.5  16.8 
2002-2004 21.5  11.9 
    
Observations 256 143 
Notes: Percentages calculated with respect to respondents that provided a date. Dates were not reported with respect to 




Table 4  Services provided by regional business associations 
  Percentage of members responding service 
has noteworthy impact (4 or 5 on 0-5 scale) 
on financial well-being  
 
  Full-time employees     Joined association   
Percentage of associations re-
sponding service important (4 or 5 
on 0-5 scale) feature of activities 








19.4 23.2    21.6  24.0    71.5  84.7 
Participating in  
legislative  
process 





18.3 11.5    12.6  13.7    61.1  73.1 
Notes: From the 280 respondents that belong to an association, we do not have dates on joining for 13.6% (50/368) of the 
 associations. The employment data are from 2001. 
 
  
Table 5  Regions in which firms surveyed 
  Democracy index  Per capita income (2001) 
Pskovskaya oblast’  5  26458 
Smolenskaya oblast’  5  35447 
Arkhangel’skaya oblast’  4.5  50159 
Kaliningradskaya oblast’  4.5  35551 
Kaluzhskaya oblast’  4.5  32408 
Nizhegorodskaya oblast’  4.5  44957 
Ryazanskaya oblast’  4.5  35069 
Stavropolsky krai  4.5  26235 
Vladimirskaya oblast’  4.5  29004 
Kostromskaya oblast’  4  31422 
Krasnoyarsky krai  4  79657 
Kurganskaya oblast’  4  25800 
Leningradskaya oblast’  4  48372 
Tul’skaya oblast’  4  32623 
Volgogradskaya oblast’  4  33173 
Altaisky krai  3.5  27851 
Bryanskaya oblast’  3.5  22938 
Komi-Permyatskiy AO  3.5  82672 
Krasnodarsky krai  3.5  37010 
Lipetskaya oblast’  3.5  42197 
Moskovskaya oblast’  3.5  39642 
Novosibirskaya oblast’  3.5  39299 
Omskaya oblast’  3.5  31723 
Permskaya oblast’  3.5  63825 
Primorsky krai  3.5  34967 
Republic of Kareliya  3.5  46572 
Rostovskaya oblast’  3.5  28470 
Saint Petersburg  3.5  58497 
Tomskaya oblast’  3.5  59050 
Voronezhskaya oblast’  3.5  26611 
Ulyanovskaya oblast’  3.5  29246 
Yaroslavskaya oblast’  3.5  51359 
Chelyabinskaya oblast’  3  41974 
Khabarovsky krai  3  56408 
Kurskaya oblast’   3  30813 
Magadanskaya oblast’  3  82625 
Novgorodskaya oblast’  3  39990 
Republic of Udmurtiya  3  43924 
Samarskaya oblast’  3  62106 
Sverdlovskaya oblast’  3  46688 
Tumenskaya oblast’  3  251982 
Orenburgskaya oblast’  2.5  41874 
Penzenskaya oblast’  2.5  23879 
Saratovskaya oblast’  2.5  33602 
Tambovskaya oblast’  2.5  27530 
Vologodskaya oblast’  2.5  52655 
Belgorodskaya oblast’  2  35186 
Moscow 2  152196 
Republic of Buratiya  2  30485 
Republic of Adygeya  1.5  15596 
Kemerovskaya oblast’  1.5  39702 
Republic of Bashkortostan  1  44994 
Republic of Tatarstan  1  57898 
 
Average  3.3 47176 
Notes: Incomes in 1000s of rubles. Sources: Democratic Audit of Russia; Yearbook 




Table 6  Membership in regional business associations 
 
  Became member of association 
 Any  time  1998  or  before  after  1998 
Democracy  (region)  0.086 0.018 0.066 
  [0.036]** [0.020] [0.028]** 
     
Log  employees  0.120 0.078 0.037 
  [0.014]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** 
     
Established  post-1991  0.109 0.046 0.079 
  [0.050]** [0.039] [0.036]** 
     
State-owned -0.098  -0.157  0.000 
  [0.096] [0.092]* [0.066] 
     
In regional capital  0.130  0.120  0.023 
 [0.040]***  [0.039]***  [0.036] 
     
Log income per capita (region)  -0.033  0.050  -0.113 
 [0.048]  [0.026]*  [0.052]** 
     
Sector  controls  Yes Yes Yes 
     
Prob>chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R2  0.1127 0.1309 0.0527 
Observations  595 546 593 
     
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional levels, in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 




Table 7   Does firm appeal and, if so, to whom in event of improper “unplanned inspection”? 
  Does not appeal    Local court    Governmental bodies 
Regional association member    -0.208      0.109      0.129 
    [0.054]***     [0.040]***     [0.033]*** 
Democracy  (region)  -0.066  -0.050  0.010  -0.000  0.048  0.036 
  [0.032]**  [0.033]  [0.031]  [0.032]   [0.022]**  [0.023] 
Log  employees  -0.057  -0.043  0.063  0.056  0.042  0.031 
  [0.024]**  [0.025]*   [0.016]***  [0.017]***  [0.015]***  [0.015]** 
Established  post-1991  -0.012  0.008  0.003  -0.007  0.050  0.035 
  [0.059]  [0.056]  [0.047]  [0.046]  [0.043]  [0.041] 
State  enterprise  -0.039  -0.050  0.043  0.048  0.117  0.128 
  [0.134]  [0.137]  [0.108]  [0.107]  [0.104]  [0.100] 
Foreign  owner  influence  -0.055  -0.036  0.059  0.049  0.022  0.008 
  [0.051]  [0.053]   [0.030]**  [0.030]  [0.031]  [0.031] 
Commercial  group  -0.059  -0.060  -0.014  -0.018  0.056  0.052 
  [0.086]  [0.082]  [0.066]  [0.064]  [0.054]  [0.050] 
Log income per cap. (region)  -0.126  -0.124    0.037  0.036    0.082  0.080 
  [0.059]** [0.058]**   [0.081]  [0.081]   [0.038]** [0.036]** 
Sector  controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  334  334  334  334  334  334 
Prob>chi2  0.0005  0.0000  0.0012  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo  R2  0.0538  0.0807  0.0798  0.0949  0.1121  0.1382 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit model are reported; robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional levels, in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
   
Table 8  Formalized participation in process of shaping new rules and regulations 
  Past 3 years, invited 
to participate in 
working groups to 
draft new laws and 
regulations 
To what degree has been able to influence ac-
tual laws and regulations (1-4 scale) 
Regional association  0.135 0.588  2.538 
  [0.041]*** [0.196]***  [0.564]*** 
Regional association x democracy (region)     -0.629 
     [0.169]*** 
Democracy (region)  0.006 -0.049  0.345 
  [0.036]   [0.122]  [0.159]** 
Log employees  0.018 0.230  0.229 
  [0.014] [0.079]*** [0.082]*** 
Established post-1991  -0.115 0.083  0.123 
  [0.050]** [0.250]  [0.256] 
State enterprise  -0.232 -0.255  -0.275 
  [0.122]* [0.304]  [0.316] 
Foreign owner influence  0.047 -0.012  -0.038 
  [0.030] [0.096]  [0.097] 
Commercial group  0.016 -0.170  -0.281 
  [0.043] [0.244]  [0.258] 
Log per capita income (region)  0.075 -0.457  -0.357 
  [0.057] [0.207]**  [0.204]* 
Sector controls  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  593 143  143 
Prob>chi2  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.0908 .1358  0.1567 
Notes: Column 1, marginal effects from probit model are reported; columns 2 and 3, ordered probit model; obust standard errors, adjusted 
for clustering at regional levels, in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
Table 9  In previous three years, did firm invest in expanding or renovating capital stock? 
Regional association  0.061 0.489 
  [0.043] [0.171]*** 
Regional association x democracy (region)   -0.126 
   [0.046]*** 
Democracy (region)  0.073 0.115 
  [0.027]** [0.032]*** 
Log employees  0.083 0.084 
  [0.015]** [0.015]*** 
Established post-1991  0.121 0.121 
  [0.051]* [0.051]** 
State enterprise  -0.117 -0.092 
  [0.114] [0.124] 
Foreign owner influence  0.016 0.011 
  [0.036] [0.037] 
Commercial group  0.055 0.052 
  [0.042] [0.042] 
Log per capita income (region)  0.098 0.097 
  [0.045]* [0.047]** 
Sector controls  Yes Yes 
Observations  593 593 
Prob>chi2  0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.0907 0.0995 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit model are reported; robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional levels, in brackets; ***, **, * significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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